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Introduction
Since September 11 2001, terrorism has become much of a priority for governments around the world. More often than not, this priority has involved rhetoric of exclusion and fear of foreigners combined with a political demand for intensifying control of cross-border movement of people. Analyses of migration and asylum policy largely affirm this intensified securitisation of migration, and especially asylum seekers since the autumn of 2001 (e.g. Brouwer et al., 2003 , Buonfino, 2004 , Welch and Schuster, 2005 , Rudolph, 2006 , Guild, 2003 , Newland et al., 2002 , Zard, 2002 , Blake, 2003 , Pickering, 2004 , den Boer and Monar, 2002 . It is less clear however how the connection between terrorism and migration or asylum has been politically sustained since 2001, and what this tells us about how the political elite renders insecurities in relation to migration and asylum.
This article researches how and in what instances did British professional politicians draw on references to migration or asylum and (counter-)terrorism in their strategies of defending and challenging various policy measures. It does so by specifically analysing parliamentary debates in which politicians related migration or asylum to (counter-)terrorism, We are aware of the limitations of using parliamentary debates as the key entry point into the political framing of policy questions in an age of mass media, blogs, focus groups, campaigning and opinion polling. However, the parliamentary debates continue to provide a strong institutional locus for researching political positioning among the political elite over time. We are also aware of the limitations of focusing on the political elite to fully grasp the institutional and wider societal renditions of a relation between migration, asylum and terrorism. The judiciary has played an increasingly important role in the political contestation of migration policy in the UK. Administrative rules are central to the practical regulation of this executive-oriented policy area. The competition and relations between various security professionals is equally important for the securitisation of migration and asylum. But we think it remains important to look in detail at how professional politicians render and contest nexuses between migration and terrorism. They are indeed important actors in aggregating various visions into political positions thereby partly structuring and partly sanctioning the terms within which this connection can be legitimately discussed in public.
The parliamentary debates indicate that the constitution of a nexus between migration and asylum has fluctuated quite significantly within the political field. In the Autumn 2001, migration and asylum were very visible in the justification and contestation of counter-terrorism. But from 2002 onwards they have been much less prominently raised in relation to counter-terrorism. The debates also show that references to terrorism are rarely deployed as a central issue in the parliamentary debates on migration and asylum policy. These findings suggest that many within the political elite are wary about inserting and especially about sustaining the connection between terrorism and migration too intensely in the public realm 2 . This does not mean that migration and asylum are not securitised: but the way they are embedded within security framings, at least among the political elite, is more multifaceted than simply suggesting that terrorism plays a major role in structuring these framings. The article 2 Our analysis has not evaluated different explanations of this. Its contribution lies elsewhere. But we can mention a number of factors that are important: a concern with possible effects on community relations and cohesion, the unwieldy effects on political legitimacy of populist politicizations of migration, reluctance of playing too much into the cards of the BNP, possible spill-over into claims for restraining economic immigration, and the relatively restrained nature of parliamentary debates.
makes a contribution to unpacking this complexity. We argue that there are at least two formats through which migration and asylum, as well as other policy issues, are politically embedded within security debates. The first we refer to as the politics of exception that focuses on the state of threat for the life of the nation, the legitimacy of exceptional policies justified by this threat and the ensuing trade off between security and liberty that it produces. The second is labelled 'the politics of unease'. It invests insecurities in a less pronounced way. It does not focus on existential threats to the territorial and functional integrity of the state but connect a variety of different policy areas such as welfare provisions, counter-terrorism and illegal immigration through the discussion of policing technologies. It consists in the insertion in the political debate (and its contestation) of a political discourse of safety and unease that links various forms of deviant and illegal practice to support the introduction of governmental technologies, such as identity cards. Focusing on counter-terrorism debates, to which the politics of exception are central, distorts the understanding of the securitising of migration and asylum. It tends to underplay the importance of the politics of unease which plays a significant role in the securitising of migration and asylum and which do not depend on references to terrorism.
In the first part of this paper, the analysis chronologically unpacks the asylum and what they told us about the way the political elite framed insecurity in the societal area. Our analysis, thus, does not seek to evaluate the constitutive or causal impact of parliamentary language on security or migration policy; not because this is deemed unimportant but because we were primarily interested in something else. We sought to understand the terms through which the political elite in the UK modulated insecurity around the migration/terrorism nexus. These are important in defining both the politically sanctioned language of public debate and its central dividing lines. 3 That also implies that our research is not a threat analysis that seeks to evaluate how real certain threats are and how they can be more effectively controlled. We are primarily interested in the politicization of dangers and its specific renditions in political positioning and justifying policy measures.
Migration as political vehicle in counter-terrorism debates 4
In the period following the attacks of 9/11/2001, immigration, and more explicitly asylum, featured significantly in the political framing of the problem of terrorism.
Abuse of the asylum system, removal and exclusion of people from the national territory soon became key elements in the legislative packages as well as in the general framing of the fight against Terror. Terrorism was unambiguously framed as being (partly) a problem of controlling both foreigners entering British terrirory and those already living in the United Kingdom. In a debate on 4 October, Prime Minister Tony Blair clearly outlined the key elements of the legislation that would be introduced in the House of Commons:
In the next few weeks, the Home Secretary intends to introduce a package of legislation to supplement existing legal powers in a number of areas. (…) It will cover the funding of terrorism. It will increase our ability to exclude and remove those whom we suspect of terrorism and who are seeking to abuse our asylum procedures. It will widen the law on incitement to include religious hatred. We will bring forward a Bill to modernise our extradition law.
The link between immigration, otherness and terrorism was present and reinforced in further discussions on the planned anti-terrorism measures. On 15 October for example the then Home Secretary David Blunkett argued (in the Commons):
I think that we all accept that there is a compelling need for more effective powers to exclude and remove suspected terrorists from our country. We rightly pride ourselves on the safe haven that we offer to those genuinely fleeing terror. But our moral obligation and love of freedom does not extend to offering hospitality to terrorists. (Catz, 2003 , Fenwick, 2002 In the Autumn of 2001, the act of relating migration and asylum to counterterrorism functioned as one of the political fault-lines in the parliamentary debates. It did not simply have the status of a statement or a section in a legislative act; rather, it functioned as an issue around which some members of parliament and more importantly party differences were organised. Similar to the Labour government, the Conservatives re-iterated the theme of removal and exclusion of foreign nationals. But they did it in a more forceful way -by connecting it explicitly with a challenge to the Human Rights Act 1998. Immigration and asylum were vehicles for challenging the government on the issue of constraining effects of human rights legislation for security policy. We already know how easy it is to generate hostility towards genuine asylum seekers.
There is a danger that they will soon be equated with potential terrorists. (…) The danger is that it will create a situation in which asylum seekers and members of ethnic minorities will face a heightened risk of social exclusion, racial attacks and harassment.
There is enough evidence to confirm that.
In response to David Blunkett, Simon Hughes, the spokesperson for Home and Legal
Affairs of the Liberal Democrats asked the following questions in the Commons on
On asylum, will the right hon. Gentleman make it absolutely clear that he will uphold the 1951 convention and that all who have a right under it to seek asylum and put their case here will retain it after the legislation is enacted? Will he make sure that, on controversial matters such as human rights and asylum, there will always be the opportunity for a judicial review of Ministers' and officials' decisions, and that no one will be precluded from going to court to challenge a decision by the Executive?
In general, immigration and asylum had become a significant element in defining political fault lines. They did not stand out as the central issue of debate but they were one among a number of issues that played an important role in the framing of terrorism and the political contestation of legislative initiatives in parliamentary politics in the autumn of 2001.
The politics of exception
What characterised the politics of insecurity within which these exchanges on immigration and asylum took place? Just after 9/11 the debates mainly focused on the need for new and emergency legislation and its ensuing effects on the balance between security and liberty (Tsoukala, 2006b , Tsoukala, 2006a These are dangerous times-I think that is agreed across the House-and there are loopholes in our national security. That, too, is agreed across the House. However, the purpose of the House and of Parliament as a whole at a time such as this is not merely to enact into law the first set of propositions that occur to Her Majesty's Government, but to achieve an appropriate balance between public safety, which it is the Home Immigration and asylum were two of the main issues around which the political debate on the nature of insecurity and the legitimacy of exceptional policies was taking place. This happened by means of what in security studies have been called 'securitising moves' or 'speech acts of security' (Waever, 1995 , Waever et al., 1993 , Buzan et al., 1998 and counter-moves. Some political actors sought to assert a threat to the life of the nation while others countered it by playing down the existential nature of the threat. The defining stake of these debates was the legitimacy of extraordinary measures such as detention without trial, the interception of private communications, and the disproportionate strengthening of executive powers.
Security questions do not simply enter this debate because of their focus on terrorism.
Insecurity is specifically spoken to legitimate exceptional politics or to deny it. We refer here to this form of security debate as 'the politics of exception'.
For example, Lord Rooker (Labour)'s intervention at the Lords on 15 th October 2001:
obviously exists, to a threat that threatens the life of this nation. That is a far more severe test, and not one that the Home Secretary will find it easy to demonstrate.
The policies that are discussed may be exceptional but the politics through which these policies are supported and contested is not. The way the debate is conducted, the mobilisation of interests etc. does not exceed the boundaries of the 'normal' institutionalised way of doing politics. What defines the security debate as a politics of exception is that the political field is structured around a contest of the legitimacy of exceptional policy measures that affect the acceptable balance between freedom and security in a liberal democracy. The positioning of MPs and peers combines or selects some of these axes. But the policy that is being justified and mostly taken for granted is one of externalising terrorist dangers. The threat, whether existential or not, comes from outside the UK, both in terms of its geographical origins and in terms of the nationality of the 'dangerous' individuals.
Immigration and asylum issues arose in this politics of exception in three different ways:
1. The abuse of asylum and immigration systems by potential terrorists featured regularly in the debates. For example: 'This is our home-it is our country.
We have a right to say that if people seek to abuse rights of asylum to be able In the Autumn of 2001 these connections between counter-terrorism and immigration and/or asylum were related to a more general -often mentioned but not often challenged -assumption that the 'danger' comes from foreigners. The assumption that one is dealing with international terrorism strongly frames the security question in terms of cross-border movements and the presence of foreigners in the national territory. Because terrorism is international, the terrorists 'must be foreign' -the threat is something which comes from migration and in order to secure the country, migration has to become an issue in the context of national security policy.
It is important to emphasise that the political stakes in the debates on ATCS 
Migration/terrorism: a fading nexus?
The nexus between migration and terrorism largely disappeared from parliamentary We consider the shortcomings described above to be sufficiently serious to strongly recommend that part 4 powers which allow foreign nationals to be detained potentially indefinitely should be replaced as a matter of urgency. New legislation should:
(a) deal with all terrorism, whatever its origin or the nationality of its suspected perpetrators; and (b) not require a derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights.
(Paragraph 203).
The Report also explicitly stated that these issues arose because "Part 4 is an adaptation of existing immigration and asylum legislation, rather than being designed expressly for the purpose of meeting the threat from international terrorism." theme re-emerged in the political debates but with a renewed emphasis on nationality rather than border crossing. Asylum was not a significant issue of debate, neither was cross-border free movement of people as such. Moreover, the relevance of deporting people from the national territory as a security instrument was heavily questioned in the debates. Nationality remained an issue in this debate. The reason was not the proportionately high threat of foreigners abusing the asylum and immigration system or entering and residing illegally. Those who argued for retaining the distinction between foreigner and citizen did this mainly on the basis that extending control orders and exceptional detention to British citizens was fundamentally unacceptable.
For this reason, the civil rights argument was now deployed -not to question but rather, to defend the distinction between citizens and migrants.
In that sense, one can indeed argue that the framing of immigration and asylum as a way of controlling cross-border movement of people was relatively They introduced two important points. Firstly, references to terrorism were largely absent from debates focusing on asylum and migration issues. Secondly, they go a long way towards showing that in the area of migration and asylum, insecurity is not primarily framed through a politics of exception but through a politics of unease, which helps to explain the low visibility of immigration and asylum in key counterterrorism discussions in Parliament since 2002.
In this section, we look at the first two cases while the third, specific case of ID cards is discussed in the next section.
One of the most intense politicisations of the nexus between terrorism and asylum was to be found in the parliamentary sessions that took place in the wake of a
Manchester police incident when a police officer was killed in a counter-terrorism operation. The suspects were believed to have entered the country as asylum seekers.
Oliver Letwin (Shadow Home Secretary Conservative Party) raised the following question in the House of Commons:
I hope that the Home Secretary will tell us today that he will redouble his efforts to increase co-ordination to match the level of threat; (…) this episode raises the question of whether our current chaotic system of asylum arrangements, of which the Home Secretary is very well aware and which he has attempted in one way and another to mend, (…) However, I regret to say that there is ample evidence that, at present, people are getting through the asylum system who do not have the best interests of this country at heart, and who intend to pursue terrorist activities. (…) In the interests of community and race relations, however, let no one suggest that we can assume that asylum seekers pose the sole threat and that it is asylum that we need to fear. It is those people who use asylum and freedom of movement throughout the world and who organise against our interests whom we must fear.
This exchange is a special case. It took place in a period of intense politicisation of asylum, to which David Blunkett hints by saying that Letwin 'must have to eat his words as he repeats his leader's decision to up the ante on asylum.' What sets this case apart from others is that the Conservative Party was explicitly instrumentalising the fight against terrorism in its politicisation of asylum. Letwin's intervention represents an exceptionalist securitising move. He inserts a threat to national security in a political debate about asylum by suggesting that an 'asylum system in tatters' is a national security problem if terrorists can exploit it to slip into Britain. In his reply the Home Secretary does not radically detach himself from using security language in relation to asylum but he seeks to refocus the security question on abusive individuals rather than presenting it as a problem of the asylum system as a whole. In so doing, he attempts at resisting the securitising move in a core area of asylum policy. He does so by framing the connection between asylum and terrorism as an instance within a more general issue occurring in counter-terrorist policies, i.e. facilitating the search for individuals engaged in terrorist activities. However, the more important observation for the purposes of our argument is that while the session contained exchanges on asylum policy these did not refer to terrorism. Only in the session on terrorism were the two explicitly connected. This is a clear example of the way in which the link between migration and terrorism issues functions in the parliamentary discourse. Counter-terrorism is not an explicitly structuring issue in the migration and asylum policy debates. Migration and asylum do emerge at certain crucial moments in the terrorism debates but not vice versa. This is confirmed by the fact that policy debates focusing on migration and asylum where not picked up by running a search on the term 'terrorism' across the plenary sessions of the Parliament.
The strong instrumentalisation of counter-terrorism (used to question the asylum system) during the 'Manchester police incident' was thus exceptional. Since January 2002, securitising moves aimed at inserting national security and a politics of exception into the debates, have only rarely been made in the context of exchanges that focussed on migration and asylum policy. In the instances in which these did occur, they were often not sustained over long periods of time. This interpretation is given more general relevance by the initial findings of Sarah Oates' analysis of media coverage of terrorism in the election campaign in 2005 in which the Conservative Party for a while explicitly played on fear and insecurity:
The initial analysis of UK news coverage suggests two key points about the parties and their coverage on BBC and the key commercial channel ITV during the 2005 campaign. First, there was relatively little discussion of terrorism and threats to national security.
The only element of the campaign that could be said to deal with basic fears about security occurred more in the economic sphere, as the Conservatives criticized what they claimed were deficiencies in the immigration and asylum system. This argument, however, focused more on the strain on or abuse of the benefits system than fears of a terrorist attack. (Oates, 2005) More recently there has been one further exception to this observation. 
The politics of unease
The relative absence of explicit securitising moves in the name of counter-terrorism in parliamentary discussions on migration, outside of the core counter-terrorism debates,
indicates that asylum and immigration are an autonomous policy debate that develops largely independently from counter-terrorism policies. However, this interpretation does not imply that there is no security framing in political debates on migration and asylum. The history of immigration and asylum policy is permeated by references to the threats of immigration and asylum for social and community cohesion, the welfare state, the sustainability of the labour market, cultural and racial identity, etc. (e.g. Goodhart, 2004 , Buonfino, 2007 , Modood, 2005 , Hampshire, 2005 , Joppke, 1999 , Schuster, 2003 One debate in which a nexus between terrorism and illegal immigration appeared in our search is particularly instructive here: the exchanges on ID cards in November 2003. This debate is of crucial importance to our argument. It shows that a connection between terrorism and migration can be mobilised to insert a politics of insecurity in political debate. However, the particular modulation of insecurity differs significantly from the debates on national security and the legitimacy of exceptional policy measures.
When in November 2003 the Commons and the Lords debated the introduction of ID cards, migration and terrorism were mentioned in both houses as justifications for introducing ID cards. The focus stayed on illegal immigration with limited references to asylum. Unlike in the interventions on anti-terrorism laws, no causal relation between illegal free movement and terrorist threat was articulated.
Tackling illegal immigration was simply another 'justification' mentioned alongside the fight against terrorism, welfare fraud and identity theft. The debate did not focus on a specific threat but rather on the development of a general context of societal insecurities and unease able to justify the introduction of identification technology.
The intervention by Beverly Hughes, then Minister for Citizenship and Immigration, is a good example of this:
We are not in the same position that we were 50 years ago. In today's world, correct identification has become imperative in a way that we could not have foreseen. We But also the criticism of Simon Thomas (MP -Plaid Cymru) illustrates this, by suggesting that ID cards are a 'solution looking for a problem'.
I would like to tackle the Government's arguments head on. However, as I said earlier, the Government have not presented a unified argument in their discussion of a national ID card. They have been as convincing as they have been consistent. We were told first that ID cards would deter international terrorism and political violence; next that they would enable the Government to end benefit fraud; and then that they were the panacea that would stop illegal immigration, asylum troubles and illegal working in the UK. A similar argument challenging the introduction of ID cards was also recurrently articulated in the Lords. There, disagreement was framed in terms of breach of liberties in the name of a questionable search for security: We found that in the ID cards debate the fault lines were not to be found in immigration and asylum. Rather, these were about the relationship between the individual and the state, the effectiveness of ID cards, and the capacity of the government to deliver.
Drawing contexts of unease in order to justify the introduction of a governmental technology such as ID cards differs significantly from the politics of insecurity in the debates on anti-terrorism laws. They invest the nexus terrorism/migration and asylum with a different rationale of insecurity. This emphasises the more technocratic, ordinary and less existential nature of the political framing of insecurities. We call this particular framing of debates on insecurity 'the politics of unease'. Its central characteristic is the construction of a continuum of threats and unease. Instead of dramatic speech acts articulating existential threats and thereby legitimating calls for exceptional politics, security practice consists of knitting various discourses of unease and danger into a patchwork of insecurities that facilitate the political exchange of fears and beliefs and the transfer of security practice from one policy area to another (Bigo, 1996 , Huysmans, 2006 , Bigo, 2002 , Bigo and Guild, 2005 The linkage thus depends on the universal applicability of the technology rather than the nature of danger and the causal connections between the different sources of unease.
In the politicisation of these contexts of unease the technology also expresses a reassurance of the capacity to govern -'we can contain the dangers and abuses if you allow us to use the technology that is available.' As a result, the political debate tends 6 An alternative to justifying ID cards for surveillance reasons, which we came across in the debates, is to focus on a more clientelistic framework that presents them as an instrument to facilitate the consumption of services for citizens -'ID cards make life easier!'.
to become dominated by the question of 'costs' (Zaba, 2005 , e.g. LSE, 2005 (Shklar, 1989 , Robin, 2004 . It opposes security measures encroaching onto civil liberties out of fear that such a process contributes to institutionalising 'arbitrary, unexpected, unnecessary and unlicensed acts of force' by public institutions (Shklar, 1989 ).
The politics of unease is thus a potent mixture of technological debates justifying and challenging policing and surveillance methods that technologically bind different policy issues and rights' debates about the relation between the state and its citizens. The ID cards debates in November 2003 offer an important correction to the picture that we extrapolated from the key debates on counter-terrorism policies.
Moreover, looking at the migration literature this particular modulation of insecurity as unease has significantly permeated migration policy and debates (e.g. Hampshire, 2005 , Schuster, 2003 . Focusing on the politics of exception, which has been central to debates on counter-terrorism policy, thus runs the risk of ignoring a key method of modulating insecurity in relation to migration and asylum.
Migration, terrorism and a dual politics of insecurity
The parliamentary debates since 2001 showed that despite the intensification of migration and asylum controls, the political positioning within the Parliament has not sustained a strong nexus between terrorism and migration or asylum. Focusing on parliamentary debates has its limits, but it gives us a sense of the positioning among the political elite as a whole, rather than simply focussing on party leaders and the Given that parliamentary debate does not fully structure migration policy, these findings do not contradict the argument that migration controls have been intensified since 9/11. However, the finding that the political elite across the board largely refrained from politically instrumentalising the nexus between migration and terrorism, questions the idea that terrorism is central to the political justification of changes in migration policy.
In the article, we were not only interested in the importance of terrorism in securitising migration and asylum. We also sought to interpret the specific characteristics of the construction of security in relation to migration and asylum and more generally the nature of the political framings through which the political elite make issues intelligible as security questions. Working through the cases in which immigration and asylum were explicitly mentioned alongside (counter-)terrorism demonstrated a dual politics of insecurity in contemporary Britain. In the key debates on anti-terrorism legislation immigration and asylum have been embedded in a politics of exception. Does terrorist violence pose a threat to the life of the nation?
Does the security problem justify exceptional policy measures? Do counter-terrorist measures strengthen executive power and curtail fundamental principles of liberal-democratic governance to such a degree that they skew the balance between freedom and security beyond the limit of what is acceptable?
Although these questions have dominated the debates on counter-terrorism (Tsoukala, 2006b) , the debate on the introduction of ID cards, an exchange following the Manchester police incident and the relative absence of references to counterterrorism in debates on asylum and immigration policy indicate that also another politics of insecurity is at work in the migration and asylum area. We referred to it as 'the politics of unease'. Insecurity is not primarily defined as the threat of radical violence to the sovereignty and functional integrity of the state but as a question of protecting legal and social order in various sites within the State. A politics of unease structures and contests a patchwork of uneasy societal relations, covering a range of deviant and illegal practices. At the heart of the political contest is the search for legitimacy of introducing policing technologies and practices across a range of policy areas. The political arguments contest the effectiveness of technologies of governance, the capacity of the government to deliver effective policing, and the protection of citizens from the institutionalisation of arbitrary acts of force by state apparatuses.
Thus, in relation to immigration and asylum the politics of insecurity contains two different processes of security framing. The politics of exception is a debate about the limits and fundamental principles of democracy that is dependent on particular crisis moments, such as 9/11 and the July bombings. The politics of unease on the other hand is a more continuous and technocratic debate that sustains or challenges the introduction of policing technologies for governing a wide range of societal questions. This observation has an important implication for public debate and political analysis of insecurity in the wake of 9/11. Much of the discussion focuses on the question of whether current security policies undermine the foundational principles of liberal democracy. Yet -however important the relation between security and liberty in democratic politics, focusing exclusively on the legitimacy and democratic compatibility of exceptional security measures overlooks a crucial dimension of the contemporary politics of insecurity that is played out in the area of immigration and asylum: governance of and through unease. Using this dual conception of processes of securitisation cautions against accepting prima facie that terrorism is central to the securitisation of migration for the political elite. It also cautions against implicitly accepting that the highly visible debates on terrorism, emergency measures, and existential threats to the state necessarily reinforce the justification for introducing surveillance techniques in the politics of unease. At least the debates on the introduction of identity cards in the UK have demonstrated that inserting a more radical understanding of threat, by means of terrorism, can be counter-productive for those seeking to introduce surveillance practices. In 2006 even the government recognised that intensifying the security significance of identity cards had been a mistake. The politics of unease continued to be central to the insertion of identity cards but its supporters became more cautious about inserting references to terrorism that would potentially reinforce the presence of a politics of exception (and which seemed to reinforce opposition to rather than support for ID cards).
For a more complete understanding of the way the political elite securitise migration as cross-border movement one needs to be able to ask 'whether' and, if so, 'how' these two framings of insecurity work -next or against one another? For this reason, it is important to work with a notion of dual politics of insecurity that does not conceptualise both security framings on a continuum ranging from less intense to more intense securitisation but rather as two discretely different framings of insecurity.
